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This paper investigates the role played by performance risk in impacting a board’s ability to learn about a 
CEO’s unknown talent and influencing their decision to fire or retain a CEO.  We posit that idiosyncratic 
stock return volatility reflects information arrival about the impact of CEO talent on firm performance, 
enhancing the informativeness of performance with respect to CEO talent, while systematic volatility 
captures aspects of return variability beyond the CEO’s control. We predict that these distinct aspects of 
volatility will have opposite effects on CEO turnover given their differential implications for the process 
of learning about CEO talent. We provide robust empirical evidence that the likelihood of CEO turnover 
is increasing in idiosyncratic risk and decreasing in systematic risk, after controlling for firm 
performance. We also predict and document that turnover-performance-sensitivity increases in 
idiosyncratic risk and decreases in systematic risk, consistent with the information content of performance 
with respect to learning about CEO’s talent increasing in idiosyncratic risk and decreasing in systematic 
risk.  This result stands in stark contrast to the extant executive compensation literature where higher 
performance risk from any source is generally expected to decrease pay-performance-sensitivity due to 
risk aversion considerations.  In our turnover setting, risk impacts the learning process, and can either 
increase or decrease turnover-performance-sensitivity depending on the underlying source of the 
volatility! Finally, we investigate relations between the threat of termination and CEO compensation, 
documenting that for retained CEOs, both subsequent pay-performance-sensitivity and pay levels 
decrease in the probability of turnover. 
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This paper investigates the role played by performance risk in impacting a board’s ability to 
learn about a CEO’s unknown talent and influencing their decision to fire or retain a CEO.  We 
posit that idiosyncratic stock return volatility reflects information arrival about the impact of 
CEO talent on firm performance, enhancing the informativeness of performance with respect to 
CEO talent, while systematic volatility captures aspects of return variability beyond the CEO’s 
control. We predict that these distinct aspects of volatility will have opposite effects on CEO 
turnover given their differential implications for the process of learning about CEO talent. We 
provide robust empirical evidence that the likelihood of CEO turnover is increasing in 
idiosyncratic risk and decreasing in systematic risk, after controlling for firm performance. We 
also predict and document that turnover-performance-sensitivity increases in idiosyncratic risk 
and decreases in systematic risk, consistent with the information content of performance with 
respect to learning about CEO’s talent increasing in idiosyncratic risk and decreasing in 
systematic risk.  This result stands in stark contrast to the extant executive compensation 
literature where higher performance risk from any source is generally expected to decrease pay-
performance-sensitivity due to risk aversion considerations.  In our turnover setting, risk impacts 
the learning process, and can either increase or decrease turnover-performance-sensitivity 
depending on the underlying source of the volatility! Finally, we investigate relations between 
the threat of termination and CEO compensation, documenting that for retained CEOs, both 





A key aspect of corporate governance is embodied in the decision rights granted to a firm’s 
board of directors to hire, compensate, and fire the chief executive officers (CEO).  These decision 
rights are manifested in comprehensive incentive schemes that include both a formal compensation 
contract and an option, exercisable at a board’s discretion, to fire and replace incumbent CEOs.  
There is a vast literature that examines the design of executive compensation contracts, including a 
number of papers focusing in particular on the important role that firm performance risk plays in 
optimal contract design via the pay-performance-sensitivity aspect of CEOs’ compensation 
contracts.1 While there also exists a significant empirical research stream that investigates relations 
between CEO turnover and realized firm performance, little attention has been directed towards 
isolating key channels through which firm performance risk can directly impact CEO turnover 
decisions.2  In this paper, we extend the extant literature by establishing fundamental connections 
between firm performance risk and CEO turnover.3   
The central focus of our analysis is on the role played by performance risk in impacting a 
board’s ability to learn about a CEO’s unknown talent.  This focus on interactions between 
performance risk and learning processes of boards introduces a very different perspective on risk 
from that typical in the executive compensation literature. The archetypical compensation setting is 
concerned with designing optimal incentives for executives to take actions that benefit shareholders. 
In this setting, performance risk represents noise with respect to observing an executive’s actions, 
                                                 
1 Key empirical papers on the relations between pay-performance-sensitivity (PPS) and performance measure risk 
include Jin (2002) and Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), among many others.  Useful reviews of the executive 
compensation literature are Murphy (2000), Bushman and Smith (2001), and Core, Guay and Larcker (2003). 
2 Major extant results include: CEO turnover is inversely related to firm performance (Coughlan and Schmidt, 1985; 
Warner, Watts and Wruck, 1988; Barro and Barro, 1990; Kaplan, 1994a,b; Brickley and Van Horn, 2002); sensitivity of 
turnover to performance increases with the fraction of outsiders on the board (Weisbach, 1988), industry homogeneity 
in product market (Parrino, 1997) and product market competition (DeFond and Park, 1999); and  CEO turnover varies 
with the business cycle (Eisfeldt and Rampini, 2008). Engel, Hayes and Wang (2003) study the properties of accounting 
information and CEO turnover, while Farrell and Whidbee (2003) examine performance expectations and CEO 
turnover. Brickley (2003) offers a useful perspective on the literature.  
3 The terms risk, variability, and volatility are used interchangeably throughout this paper.  
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and risk-averse executives must be paid a risk premium for bearing performance risk, regardless of 
the source of the risk.  In contrast to the role of firm performance in the provision of incentives, 
CEO turnover decisions instead utilize firm performance to learn about a CEO’s unobservable 
talent.  A key element in a board of director’s decision to retain or dismiss an incumbent CEO is the 
board’s assessment of the CEO’s talent relative to the assessed talent of potential replacement 
CEOs.  This learning perspective shifts the focus from the impact of performance risk on the risk 
premium demanded by risk-averse executives, to the role played by performance risk in facilitating 
or impeding a board’s ability to learn about CEO talent from realized performance.4  
The fundamental insight of our paper is that the impact of performance risk on the ability of 
boards to learn about CEO talent from firm performance depends crucially on the underlying 
sources of the risk.  The idea is that if volatility in performance outcomes is driven primarily by 
unobservable CEO talent, firm performance will be diagnostic about such talent, allowing boards to 
accurately assess CEO talent and to replace low talent incumbents.  On the other hand, if volatility 
in performance outcomes is driven by factors unrelated to CEO talent (e.g., noise, economy-wide 
effects, etc.), then a board’s ability to infer CEO talent from performance is more limited, making it 
difficult to cleanly distinguish an incumbent’s talent level from the assessed talent of  potential  
replacement CEOs.   
To isolate these two fundamental economic forces, we first analyze a simple, two-period 
model with symmetric learning about unknown CEO talent.  We derive the optimal firing rule as a 
function of two sources of risk: risk deriving from uncertainty about a CEO’s unobservable talent 
level, and risk deriving from sources outside the CEO’s control.  The model produces three 
                                                 
4 We are not arguing here that the compensation contract is independent of the board’s firing option.  In fact, as 
discussed further below, we show in our model of section 2 and in the empirical analyses of section 6, that the firing 
option does indeed impact the compensation contract both by necessitating that the CEO be compensated for bearing the 
risk of being fired (see also Hermalin and Weisbach (2008) on this point) and by creating implicit incentives for CEOs 
to work hard in order to avoid being fired. What we are arguing is that because the board cannot commit not to fire the 
CEO after observing firm performance, the role of performance risk in CEO turnover can be studied independently of 
any risk premium due to firing risk or implicit incentives as these will not be factored into the turnover decision. 
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empirical implications concerning the relation between performance risk and CEO turnover. First, 
the probability of CEO turnover is increasing in the variance of the distribution over CEO talent. 
When uncertainty over CEO talent increases relative to other sources of variability, firm 
performance becomes relatively more diagnostic about CEO talent, increasing the board’s ability to 
detect low talent incumbents and exercise their firing option when warranted.  Second, the 
probability of CEO turnover is decreasing in volatility unrelated to talent and beyond the CEO’s 
control. Such volatility represents noise from the perspective of learning about a CEO’s talent from 
observed performance. More noise increases the difficulty of distinguishing the talent of incumbents 
from those of potential rookie CEOs, increasing the board’s reluctance to incur the costs of 
exercising their firing option.  Finally, the third implication is that the sensitivity of CEO turnover 
to observed performance is increasing in the variance of the distribution of CEO talent and 
decreasing in volatility unrelated to talent.    
Turning to our empirical analysis, we use stock returns as our empirical measure of firm 
performance and decompose return volatility into its idiosyncratic and systematic components. We 
posit that idiosyncratic volatility reflects information arrival related to the impact of CEO talent on 
firm performance, while systematic volatility captures aspects of return variability unrelated to CEO 
talent and beyond the CEO’s control. We predict that these distinct aspects of volatility will have 
opposite effects on CEO turnover given their differential implications for the process of learning 
about CEO talent.  Consistent with this prediction, we provide robust empirical evidence that the 
likelihood of CEO turnover is increasing in idiosyncratic risk and decreasing in systematic risk, 
after controlling for firm performance.     
We also predict and document that turnover-performance-sensitivity increases in 
idiosyncratic risk and decreases in systematic risk, consistent with the information content of 
performance with respect to learning about CEO’s talent increasing in idiosyncratic risk and 
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decreasing in systematic risk.5  This result stands in stark contrast to the extant executive 
compensation literature where higher performance risk from any source is generally expected to 
decrease pay-performance-sensitivity due to risk aversion considerations.  In our turnover setting, 
risk impacts the learning process, and can either increase or decrease turnover-performance-
sensitivity depending on the underlying source of the volatility! 
It is instructive to contrast our analysis of risk and CEO turnover to Jin’s (2002) analysis of 
risk and CEO pay-performance-sensitivity. Analogous to our study, Jin (2002) also decomposes the 
volatility of stock returns into idiosyncratic and systematic components. Using data on executive 
compensation contracts, he documents that idiosyncratic risk is negatively related to pay-
performance-sensitivity, but finds little relation between systematic risk and incentive level.  These 
results are consistent with Jin’s (2002) model where all (unhedged) sources of performance 
volatility represent risk that the CEO must be compensated for bearing, resulting in the classic 
trade-off between CEO incentives and the cost of CEOs’ bearing risk.6  In contrast, in our setting 
higher volatility driven by factors related to CEO talent (i.e., idiosyncratic risk) makes firm 
performance more diagnostic about talent, where volatility unrelated to CEO talent (i.e., systematic 
risk) is noise from a learning perspective. Thus, our paper complements Jin (2002) by exploring the 
impact of performance volatility in a different, but interrelated context, revealing distinct channels 
through which performance risk impacts contracting relations between boards and CEOs.  .   
In section 6, we complete our empirical analysis by exploring interrelations between the 
firing option and CEO compensation.  First, we document that for retained CEOs, pay-performance-
sensitivity is decreasing in the probability of turnover.  This is consistent with the insight from our 
                                                 
5 By turnover-performance-sensitivity, we are referring to the relation of turnover to firm-specific returns.  We do not 
examine the determinants of the relation of turnover to the systematic component of stock returns.  We discuss this 
further below. 
6 A central point in Jin (2002) is that CEOs may be able to hedge the systematic aspects of performance risk, obviating 
the need to pay a risk premium for this aspect of risk.   
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model that when the probability of turnover is high, the CEO faces high-powered implicit incentives 
and so requires less explicit incentives.7  We also document that for CEOs who are retained, 
subsequent pay levels are a decreasing function of the probability of turnover, consistent with Gao, 
Harford and Li (2008), who show that pay cuts can be a short-term substitute for dismissal. They 
find that after a pay cut, a CEO with continued poor performance is just as likely to be fired as a 
CEO with similar performance whose pay was not cut. 
Finally, it is important to relate our paper with Jenter and Kanaan (2008) and Kaplan and 
Minton (2006), who document that the systematic component of returns significantly influences the 
likelihood of CEO turnover, contrary to the received theory of relative performance evaluation.8 In 
contrast, we investigate how both idiosyncratic and systematic return volatility impacts CEO 
turnover. We do incorporate the Jenter and Kanaan (2008) and Kaplan and Minton (2006) results in 
our empirical analyses by including the systematic component of returns in our analyses to mitigate 
potential model misspecification (and indeed replicate their results). However, we are not aware of 
any theory connecting systematic return volatility to violations of relative performance evaluation. 
It is important to stress that our analysis only requires that systematic return volatility impede ability 
to learn about talent from performance, and we provide evidence consistent with this story, 
including that the likelihood of turnover is decreasing in systematic risk, after controlling for 
idiosyncratic and systematic returns.   
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we analyze a two-period model and develop 
empirical implications. Section 3 describes the data underlying our empirical analyses and provides 
descriptive statistics. Section 4 presents our empirical analyses about the relations between CEO 
turnover and distinct components of risk, while section 5 presents our results on the relation 
                                                 
7 This idea is closely related to the career concerns results of Gibbons and Murphy (1992) and Holmström (1999). 
8 In the theory of relative performance evaluation (e.g., Holmström, 1982 and Gibbons and Murphy, 1992), aspects of 
performance that are not influenced by the CEO should be filtered out in optimal contract design. 
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between turnover-performance-sensitivity and risk.  Section 6 examines the implications of CEO 
turnover decisions for CEO compensation contracts and Section 7 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. The Model and Empirical Implications 
2.1 Basic Assumptions and Model Setup 
CEOs are endowed with a given level of talent. The CEO and the firm have common 
knowledge about the distribution over CEO talent, but neither party knows the actual level of CEO 
talent (i.e., it is a symmetric learning process).9 CEOs are ex ante identical, with all market 
participants holding identical prior beliefs over talent. The firm operates for two periods, t = 1, 2. A 
contract is signed between the firm and the CEO at the beginning of period one. The firm updates 
beliefs about the incumbent CEO’s talent at the end of the first period based on the observable, 
period one performance, and decides whether to fire or retain the CEO at that point.  
Following Gibbons and Murphy (1992), we assume that two-period contracts are not 
feasible, and that one-period contracts are linear in observable output. The per-period production 
technology is given by: 
                 tttt ey       2,1t                                               (1) 
where ty  is period t output, t  represents unknown CEO talent, te  represents CEO effort, and t  is 
a normally distributed random shock with mean zero and variance 2 for 2,1t .We assume that t  




Per-period CEO compensation is given as: 
                                                 
9 This assumption is also made in Gibbons and Murphy (1992), Holmstrom (1999) and Hermalin and Weisbach (2008), 
among others. 
10 True CEO talent,, is assumed fixed in the model. However, as noted also in Hermalin and Weisbach (2008), one 
concern is that CEO’s ability would be quickly revealed in repeated version of the model. Holmstrom (1999) however, 
shows that rapid learning can be eliminated by allowing   to follow a random walk across periods.  
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                             ,tttt ybaw          2,1t                                                                      (2)  
where tw  is the CEO's compensation for period t, and ta  and tb  are compensation parameters. 
 We assume that the CEO is risk-averse and the firm is risk-neutral. Further, we assume that 
the period utility function for the CEO is mean-variance with   as a risk-aversion parameter for 
tractability.11 Without loss of generality, we also assume that there is no discounting for either the 
CEO or the firm. Assuming no borrowing or lending, the CEO derives his period utility only from 
current period compensation.12 If the incumbent CEO is fired at the end of period one, he receives 
severance pay, S, and exits the labor market.  In this case, the firm then hires a rookie CEO with 
talent drawn from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance
2
0 .    
Figure 1 illustrates the time line. At the beginning of period one the firm signs a 
compensation contract with a CEO. The CEO exerts effort and period one output is realized. The 
firm pays the CEO, updates its belief about talent, and decides whether or not to fire the CEO (the 
decision is denoted as F). In period two, the firm works either with the incumbent (F=0), or with a 
newly hired CEO (F=1). The CEO exerts effort for period two, output is realized, the CEO is paid, 
and the firm is dissolved.  
2.2 The Optimal Firing Rule 
Using backward induction, we first derive the optimal contract for period two. At the 
beginning of period two, the firm employs either a rookie or an incumbent CEO. If the incumbent is 
fired in period one (F=1), the firm has a simple one-period problem with no learning possibilities 
with respect to the new CEO’s talent. Thus, the firm solves:  





                                                 
11  The standard CARA utility function is problematic here due to possible discontinuity at the end of period one.  
12 This is in contrast to the LEN framework many researchers use in the dynamic setup. Under LEN, only aggregate 
compensation matters, while per-period compensation does not. The LEN framework is equivalent to the assumption 
that the CEO has perfect access to the capital market for borrowing and lending. 
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where the period effort cost function is 2
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 uFa .                        (7) 
These are standard results from a single-period principal-agent model.13  
On the other hand, when the incumbent CEO is retained (F=0), the firm incorporates 
learning about CEO talent from period one output, and solves the problem:  
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]|[ .                              (9) 
                                                 
13 Optimal effort equates with the optimal incentive parameter ( 22 be  ), and the base salary ( 2a ) is set such that the 
participation constraint (4) holds with equality. The incentive parameter, )1(*2 Fb , is decreasing in the output 
variance 2 , the variance over talent 20 , and risk aversion parameter  . This simply reflects the optimal trade-off 
between incentives and risk. 
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Note that u , the period two reservation utility, is assumed to be identical for both the 
incumbent and the rookie CEO, despite the fact that the incumbent’s assessed talent would be 
updated based on observing 1y . We want to emphasize that this assumption is made strictly for 
tractability purposes. A CEO’s outside opportunity wage would almost surely adjust up or down on 
the arrival of new information about general managerial talent that is transferable across companies, 
but may not adjust to information about  firm-specific talent that is valuable only within the 
organization.14 To create scope for firing, it is necessary that the reservation wage not decrease so 
much in response to poor performance that the principal is always indifferent to talent because 
revised pay levels could completely offset any talent differentials.15 Rather than complicate the 
model with issues of general versus specific talent, or other potential frictions in the adjustment of 
outside opportunity wages, we make the simplifying assumption that reservation wage is downward 
rigid.  The assumption of no upward adjustment is not crucial. While addressing this in the model is 
beyond the scope of this paper, we think this is an important issue that needs to be at least addressed  
from an empirical standpoint. In section 6 of the paper, we empirically explore the possibility that 
the board could lower a CEO’s pay following poor performance rather than firing him.   
Returning again to the analysis of the period 2  contract with the incumbent CEO still in 
place, the CEO and the firm update priors over ability after 1y  is realized (i.e., symmetric learning). 

















yE                                                                             (10) 
                                                 
14Murphy and Zabojink (2007) argue that there has been a recent increase in the importance of "managerial ability" 
(CEO skills transferable across companies) relative to "firm-specific human capital" (valuable only within the 
organization).  Of course the relative importance of general versus firm-specific aspects is also likely to vary 
significantly in the cross-section.  
15 To clearly understand our downward rigidity assumption, contrast it with the assumption made in Gibbons and 
Murphy (1992) and Holmstrom (1999).  These papers assume that the manager receives the entire surplus while the 
principal earns zero profits.  In this case, the principal is indifferent to updated talent assessments and has no incentive 
to fire the manager. Downward rigidity creates a wedge where under some circumstances the pay necessary to retain a 
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where 1̂e  is the firm’s conjecture about CEO’s first period effort.
16  Solving the principal’s period 








































 uFa .                     (14)  
Given the optimal period two contracts for an incumbent or rookie CEO, we solve for the 
cutoff that triggers the firing option. First, we substitute the optimal solutions for the rookie from 
equations (5), (6), and (7) into the principal’s objective function yielding expected period two profit 













 .                                                              (15) 
We assume that S is smaller than u .17  Similarly, using equations (12), (13), and (14), the expected 
period two profit when the incumbent CEO is retained is given by:  
                                                 
16 Since the CEO knows his effort level, he uses the true 1e  to update. The firm, on the other hand, has to conjecture 
effort. In equilibrium, the conjectured effort will equal the true effort level. For the CEO’s perspective, just replace 1̂e  
with 1e .  
17 We also need to assume that 0 is sufficiently large that )1( F is positive. Otherwise, the firm will shut down. 
Also, while we call S severance, it is important to note that there would likely be other costs associated with CEO 
turnover.  These include the costs of finding a new CEO, costs due to disruption of business, etc. (see e.g., Hermalin, 
2005).  For purposes of drawing empirical implications for the current study, it is not important to distinguish between 
these costs.  It would matter however in deriving period one compensation contracts, as severance payments go directly 
to a fired CEO, while the other costs are born by the principal directly. That the firing threshold is adjusted for direct 
costs of firing the CEO has been noted in previous studies. See, for example, Hirshleifer and Thakor (1998), Hermalin 














 .                                                                   (16) 
The updated talent assessment that triggers firing, *1 , is derived by equating expected period two 
profits across the two scenarios.  Equating (15) and (16) and solving yield the optimal cutoff 
point, x 0
*
1  , where  
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otherwise                  
 if                  
F
0
1 *11  
This leads to proposition one.18  
Proposition 1 There exists a unique cutoff point ( *1 ) for a CEO’s assessed talent at the end of 
period one such that if *11   , the CEO is  retained. Otherwise, he is fired. 
*
1  is defined as in 
equation (17).  
Proof: It is straightforward to show the intersection between the two profit lines is unique.  
From the expression for x in equation (17), we see that it is costly to fire the incumbent CEO 
due to severance pay, S, so the cutoff decreases in S. The cutoff is also affected by the posterior 
variance of incumbent CEO talent ( 21 ) relative to the variance of a potential rookie’s talent (
2
0 ).  
In essence, learning lowers the posterior variance over talent for an incumbent relative to an outside 
rookie.  This mitigates a source of risk in the performance measure, allowing the principal to 
increase incentive intensity in period two for the incumbent due to the reduced demands on the risk 
premium needed to compensate the manager for risk.  Thus, the term x in expression (17) is the cost 
                                                 
18 If the reservation wage of the incumbent in period two were allowed to vary with posterior assessed talent, the cutoff 
would be given by )()( 01
*
1  uu  , where )( iu  is the reservation utility given i .  Note that without our 
assumption of downward rigidity, )( 1u could be small enough to preclude firing. 
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of firing an incumbent CEO, consisting of the severance payment and the higher risk premium that 
must be paid to a replacement CEO relative to the incumbent due to higher uncertainty about the 




 We next develop intuition of the model further, and derive the empirical implications of the 
model for the relation between CEO turnover and risk.  
2.3 Empirical Implications of the Model for Relations between Turnover and Risk 
We derive three empirical implications in this section.  The key construct underlying these 
implications is the ex ante probability of firing the CEO. This can be written using the optimal 




















 xF ,  
where 
1
  is the standard deviation of posterior mean talent, 1 , and )( is the cumulative 
distribution function for the standard normal distribution.   
To understand the intuition underpinning the model’s empirical implications, recall that the 
posterior distribution over talent given 1y  is characterized by 




































  ,                                                                        (10)      
                                                 
19 To see this, suppose that updated ability, 1 , were equal to that of a potential rookie, 0 . Now, if the firm fires the 
CEO, it would hire a new CEO with the same expected talent, but with a variance over talent ( 20 ) larger than that for 
the incumbent CEO ( 21 ).  This would increase the risk premium necessary to compensate the CEO for bearing risk 
without increasing the expected payoff to talent. This risk premium, while subtle and interesting,  is likely to be a 
second order effect relative to severance and the posterior volatility over the incumbents talent (
1
 ), so we do not 













 yVar .                                                                                            (11) 
From (10), we see that as 
 0  , the ratio of talent risk relative to production risk (signal to noise 
ratio), gets small, the posterior assessment of talent, 1 , becomes insensitive to performance, 
implying that the board learns little about the CEO’s talent from realized performance.  In this case, 
the posterior is close to the prior, 0  (the opportunity talent level of a rookie), and the firing 
probability is low.20  However, when the posterior is sensitive to the performance signal, a negative 
signal causes the posterior to be low, potentially triggering a firing event. In the next proposition, 
















Proposition 2  
(i). There exists a function ),,( 220 K (defined in the Appendix) such that, if ),,(
22










(ii)  There exists a function ),,( 220 G (defined in the appendix) such that, if ),,(
22








<0.  It is the case that 
2
G

























G . It is the case that ),,( 220 G ≥ ),,(
22
0 K for all values of 
0
2 , 2  and  , implying that if the conditions of this proposition are met, ),,( 220 KS  and so 
proposition 2 also holds. 
 Proof: See Appendix. 
                                                 
20 In the limit, if the cost of firing S>0, the firm would not pay S to buy a rookie with the same talent distribution as the 
incumbent, implying that the probability of firing is 0.  However, if S=0, firing the manager is free, and since the talent 
distribution is identical for incumbent and rookie, the firm is indifferent between retaining implying a firing probability 
of one half (i.e., a coin toss).   
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This leads to the following two empirical implications.   
Empirical Implication 1: The probability of CEO turnover is increasing in the variance over CEO 
talent, holding firm performance and variance unrelated to CEO talent constant. 
 
Empirical Implication 2: The probability of CEO turnover is decreasing in the variance unrelated 
to CEO talent, holding firm performance and variance over CEO talent constant. 
 
Next, we consider how the sensitivity of turnover to observed performance is influenced by 
both 20  and 
2 .  In our simple two period model, the firing cutoff value, *1 , does not depend on 
the realization of the signal, but only on the variance-covariance matrix. The realization of 
performance only determines whether the board’s posterior assessment of talent is above or below 





















do not have any 
content. However, the probability of turnover is increasing in 20  implying that the performance 
threshold for firing moves closer to the mean of performance in standard deviation terms as 20  
increases, increasing the range of outcomes over which turnover occurs.  On the other hand, CEO 
turnover is less responsive to performance when 2  is higher, moving the threshold further below 
the mean in standard deviations terms, decreasing the range of outcomes over which turnover will 
occur.  Figure 2 illustrates the intuition, leading to the third empirical implication of the model. 
Empirical Implication 3: CEO turnover will be less sensitive to observed performance as 
2 increases, and more sensitive to observed performance as 20  increases. 
 
It is informative to note that our model can be intuitively interpreted from the perspective of 
real options. That is, the firm can view the possibility of firing of the CEO as an (abandonment) 
option where the strike price is given by the severance package (and the period two risk premium 
differential discussed in the previous section).21 The option will be “in the money” when the 
                                                 
21 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
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underlying asset value, here the assessed talent of the incumbent CEO, is sufficiently low relative to 
that of a replacement. As is well known from option pricing theory, the value of this option is 
increasing in the volatility of the underlying assessed talent, 
1
 . Intuitively, high volatility,
1
 , 
implies that the board’s assessment of talent is very sensitive to the signal, which occurs when the 
signal is informative about the CEO’s talent. The informativeness of the signal and the volatility of 
the underlying asset value are increasing in the idiosyncratic risk of talent of the incumbent CEO 
( 20 , measured in our empirical tests by the idiosyncratic risk of the past firm performance), and 
decreasing in risk unrelated to CEO talent ( 2 , measured by the systematic risk of firm 
performance).22 In essence, higher idiosyncratic risk increases the signal’s informativeness and the 
volatility of assessed talent, thus increasing the probability of the CEO being fired and equivalently, 
the value of the firing option.  Higher systematic risk does just the opposite. 
In a related model, Hermalin and Weisbach (2008) focus on benefits and costs of changing 
the quality of performance measures in corporate governance settings, including CEO turnover 
decisions.23  They show that by increasing the quality of the performance measure relative to 
assessed CEO talent, the value of the firing option to the principal increases. Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2008) are concerned with understanding the determinants of optimal performance 
measure quality. In contrast, we take the quality of the information system as fixed and exogenous, 
and focus on the determinants of the probability of firing. While the models share some 
commonalities, the objectives of the two papers differ significantly. 
We examine empirical implications 1 and 2 in section 4, and implication 3 in section 5. 
2.4 Empirical Implications for Relations between the Firing Option and CEO Compensation 
                                                 












  . 
23 Other models of turnover include Hirshleifer and Thakor (1998), Hermalin and Weisbach (1998), Warther (1998), 
Spear and Wang (2005), Adams and Ferreira (2007), Hermalin (2005), Eisfeldt and Rampini (2008), among others. 
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Finally, we consider the impact of the firing option on the first period wage contract.  The 
following proposition characterizes the first period contract. 
Proposition 3 
Optimal first period effort, *1e ,  and pay-performance-sensitivity,
*













































































  are, respectively, the density 
function and cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution.  
Proof:  See Appendix for a sketch of the proof. 
Note that pay-performance-sensitivity, *1b , consists of two terms, where the second term 
depends on the firing option both through the function, )( , and the CDF, )( .  As )( < ½, and  
taking 1u  > S, this second term will be non-negative (it will be zero if there is no probability of 
firing).  That is, the existence of a non-trivial firing option results in a decrease in first period pay-
performance-sensitivity relative to a setting without such an option. In essence, the firing option 
creates implicit incentives, analogous to career concerns (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992), allowing the 
principal to back off on explicit incentives.  These implicit incentives are evident in the term for 
period one effort, *1e , where we see that the firing option increases effort through the second term in 
(18).  This leads to our fourth empirical implication. 
Empirical Implication 4: The existence of a non-trivial firing option creates implicit incentives that 
serve to decrease period one pay-performance-sensitivity. 
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We investigate empirical implication 4 in section 6 below. We turn now to our empirical analysis. 
 
3. CEO Turnover: Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Data and Construction of the Forced Turnover Sample 
Identifying whether a CEO turnover event is forced is not straightforward as involuntary 
turnovers are often presented as retirement. Classification thus requires hand-collection of data from 
multiple sources, in particular press releases.  We follow the classification scheme devised by 
Parrino (1997) to classify turnovers into forced and routine.24 
CEO turnovers are identified using the Standard & Poors ExecuComp database for the time 
period 1992 to 2005. We isolate a CEO turnover for each year in which the CEO identified in 
ExecuComp changes (2,281 events). We then search the Factiva news database for details about the 
turnover and classify each CEO turnover as forced or routine. All turnovers for which press articles 
report that the CEO is fired, demoted, or retires or resigns under questionable circumstances (e.g., 
policy differences, pressure, lawsuits or suspected earnings management), are classified as forced 
(500 events). We further investigate turnovers when the CEO retires at age below 60 and classify 
them as forced if the article does not report the reason as death, poor health, or the acceptance of 
another position (294 events). Finally, we exclude CEO turnovers due to death, interim, mergers or 
spin-offs from the analysis (238 events),25  and we lose 220 turnover events due to missing financial 
data. Given our model implication, all our empirical analysis is based on forced CEO turnovers.    
                                                 
24 We have taken great care in classifying our turnover sample, but acknowledge the possibility that we have incorrectly 
classified some voluntary turnovers as forced. We have verified that our results are robust to alternative classification 
schemes, such as using the announcements only without reclassification of retirements, or using retirement age of 61 or 
62. As argued in Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), voluntary turnovers are unlikely to be related to performance and so 
the difficulty in distinguishing the two types of turnovers simply adds noise to the dependent variable.   
25We do not distinguish turnovers by whether the replacement CEO was hired from inside or outside the firm. Important 
papers examining the decision to hire an insider versus an outsider include Cremers and Grinstein (2008), Murphy and 
Zabojnik (2007), Parrino (1997) and Chan (1996), among others. 
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This process results in 794 forced turnovers, with the remaining 1,029 turnovers classified as 
routine turnovers. The control sample consists of firm-years in the ExecuComp where no turnovers 
occurred. Accordingly, we have the following 3 samples: a routine turnover sample (N=1,029), a 
forced turnover sample (N=794), and a control sample (N=15,965).  Table 1 provides summary 
statistics for the 3 samples.  
We merge this data set with firms’ financial data from Compustat and CRSP.    
3.2 Variable Definition and Measurement 
We estimate empirical proxies for the model constructs talent risk ( 0 ) and unrelated risk 
( ) by decomposing total return volatility into its idiosyncratic and systematic return volatility 
components. We posit that information about CEO talent will be reflected in the firm-specific 
component of stock return performance, while the systematic component represents noise with 
respect to learning about CEO talent.26  
Our proxy for talent risk ( 0 ), denoted Risk_ Idiosyncratic, is constructed as the standard 
deviation of the idiosyncratic portion of stock returns after removing industry returns, while our 
proxy for production risk ( ), denoted Risk_ Peer, is the standard deviation of a firm’s stock 
returns due to industry effects.27  We use daily returns over the prior year to construct Risk_ Peer 
and Risk_ Idiosyncratic. Specifically, we run the following firm-specific regressions using daily 
stock returns: 
1,1,01,   titindustryIti rr  , 
                                                 
26 It is difficult to empirically separate variability in idiosyncratic performance specifically due to CEO talent from 
other stochastic variation unrelated to industry or market shocks.  As result, our measure of idiosyncratic return 
volatility captures a mix of the effect of talent and other aspects of firm-specific performance, some of which may be 
outside the CEO’s control.  See also a related discussion in Jenter and Kanaan (2008). 
27 In our main analyses, we use industry returns as benchmark performance in our first stage regressions to decompose 
performance (risk) into the systematic component and the idiosyncratic component. Alternatively, we have also used the 
following two as peer groups: (1) both industry and market returns; (2) market returns only. We find qualitatively 
similar results as those presented in the paper. 
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where , 1industry tr  is industry median daily returns. We run individual firm regressions using daily 
returns in fiscal year t-1, provided that there are at least 100 of the 256 daily returns available for 
each firm-year.  The standard deviation of the predicted values from this regression, 
1,0
ˆˆ
 tindustryI r , is our proxy for Risk_ Peer, and the standard deviation of the residual returns, 
1,ˆ ti ,  is our proxy for Risk_ Idiosyncratic.   
We include two aspects of a firm’s stock return performance, an idiosyncratic component 
conjectured to capture effects of CEO talent (Ret_ Idiosyncratic), and a systematic component due 
to industry returns (Ret_ Peer).  We include the decomposed performance measures to avoid model 
misspecification in light of the results documented in Jenter and Kannan (2008) and Kaplan and 
Minton (2006) that CEO turnover is sensitive to both aspects of performance. Specifically, we run 
the following first-stage cross-sectional regressions using one year lagged annual returns:28 
1,1,01,   titindustryIti rr  , 
where , 1i tr   is firm specific return and , 1industry tr   is industry-median return. The predicted value from 
the regression, 1,0 ˆˆ  tindustryI r , is our proxy for Ret_ Peer, and the residual return, 1, ti , is our 
proxy for Ret_ Idiosyncratic.29 
Finally, we construct an accounting-based risk measure denoted Risk_ ROA, measured as the 
standard deviation of quarterly industry median adjusted earnings growth over the  past 4 years.  We 
require that data from at least 8 of the 16 quarters are available.30, 31 Due to data limitation, we do 
not decompose this risk further. We also include return on assets (ROA) as an accounting 
                                                 
28 The performance effect on turnover could potentially extend beyond one lag (e.g., Kim, 1996; Jenter and Kanaan, 
2008; and Kaplan and Minton, 2006). For robustness, we run the analyses including lagged 2 year performance 
measures and risk measures estimated over the past two years. All of our results are robust to this specification.  
29 While the regression specifications are the same for both risk and performance decompositions, the data frequency 
differs. For robustness, we use daily returns to estimate firm-specific industry betas for each firm year, and then 
construct annualized Ret_Idiosyncratic and Ret_Peer. Our results are robust to this alternative estimation.   
30 Earnings growth rates (not earnings itself) are used to remove seasonality, similar to Berger, Chen and Li (2006).  
31 We also try the standard deviation of (Earn t - Earn t - 4) / Assets t – 4 and find qualitatively similar results. 
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performance measure. Following prior literature, we use lagged one year median industry adjusted 
ROA, deducting the industry median ROA from the firm’s ROA. We define industry based on two-
digit SIC industry codes, and use Compustat /CRSP firms as our industry comparison group.  
3.3 Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics for all variables used in turnover analyses are presented in Table 1 for 
the routine turnover sample, the forced turnover sample, and the control sample separately. Across 
all performance measures, the forced turnover sample has the lowest mean/median, and the control 
sample has the highest mean/median. The mean (median) Ret Idiosyncratic is -13.5% (-19.5%) for 
the forced turnover sample, and 4.1% (-6.5%) for the control sample, while ROA is 0.6% (1.1%) for 
the forced turnover sample, and 4.3% (2.6%) for the control sample. The same pattern holds for 
Ret_Peer, but with a less pronounced difference (13.5% vs. 18.9%) between the forced turnover 
sample and the control sample.32  
Turning to our risk measures, we find that on average, the forced turnover sample has the 
highest risk and the control sample has the lowest risk. Mean (median) Risk_ Idiosyncratic is 0.46 
(0.40) for the forced turnover sample and 0.38 (0.33) for the control sample. The same ordering 
holds for Risk_Peer but with smaller differences across samples. Finally, we note that the forced 
turnover sample has the highest value of Risk_ROA (1.88/ 1.78), and the control sample has the 
lowest value of Risk_ROA (1.52/1.29).  
With regard to control variables, we note that, relative to routine CEO turnovers, CEOs who 
are forced out tend to be younger (53.7 vs. 61.7 years old), have shorter tenure (7.5 vs. 12.1 years), 
and less likely to be the company founder (0.099 vs. 0.178).33 We also note that firms with forced 
turnovers are more likely to be smaller (7.30 vs. 7.58 of log assets) and younger (22.92 vs. 27.42 
                                                 
32 We note that the industry-adjusted ROA is fairly high in our sample.  Since we use CRSP firms as our industry 
comparison group, this is a likely result due to the sample selection induced by ExecuComp firms. 
33 Younger CEOs in the forced sample could be partially attributed to the fact that we reclassify some of the retirements 
into forced sample based on the age they “retired”. 
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years), and face more competition (429 vs. 391 firms in the same industry), compared to firms 
associated with routine turnovers. For corporate governance measures, forced turnover firms have 
slightly lower G-index (9.2 vs. 9.5) and higher board independence (0.65 vs. 0.63) relative to 
routine turnover firms though the institution ownership is similar (0.58 vs. 0.59).  
 
4.  Empirical Analysis of CEO Turnover and the Decomposition of Risk 
In section 4.1, we present in table 2 our main analysis of our predictions that CEO turnover 
probability is increasing in Risk_ Idiosyncratic (due to enhanced learning potential) and decreasing 
in Risk_ Peer (due to reduced learning potential), after controlling for firm performance.  In table 3 
we examine whether the impact of the two components of risk on turnover varies with two CEO 
characteristics: CEO tenure and company founder status. In section 4.2, we extend the analysis to 
include three governance metrics: institutional ownership percentage, board independence, and the 
Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) G-index. In all specifications, we include a number of key 
control variables and year dummies (all variables are defined in detail in table 1). We compute 
robust standard errors clustered at the firm level in all regressions.   
4.1 Empirical Relations between CEO Turnover and Risk, Controlling for Performance 
Table 2 presents the results of our Probit analysis of the relation between forced CEO 
turnover and two risk constructs, Risk_ Idiosyncratic and Risk_ Peer.  The dependent variable is 
forced turnover, defined as one if there is a forced turnover in a given firm/year, and zero otherwise.  
We report results estimating the systematic component of returns against three different benchmark 
returns. Column (1) estimates the systematic component of returns relative to industry median 
returns, column (2) uses value-weighted market returns only, and column (3) uses both value-
weighted market returns and industry median returns.  For each analysis, we report both the Probit 
coefficient estimate and an estimate of the economic significance for each variable.  Economic 
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significance is computed as the product of three terms: the coefficient estimate times mean turnover 
density (this product is the marginal effect of the variable), times the standard deviation of the 
variable (e.g., Greene, 1997). 
 Consistent with our hypothesis that the two distinct aspects of risk will have opposite effects 
on CEO turnover, table 2 documents that in all three specifications, Risk_ Idiosyncratic is positively 
and significantly associated with the probability of forced turnover, and Risk_ Peer is negatively 
and significantly associated with turnover. That is, higher levels of Risk_ Idiosyncratic are 
consistent with performance being more diagnostic about CEO talent, and higher levels of Risk_ 
Peer with performance being less diagnostic. Turning to economic significance, a one standard 
deviation increase in Risk_ Idiosyncratic is associated with a greater than 1.4% increase in the 
probability of forced turnover across specifications, while a one standard deviation increase in Risk_ 
Peer is associated with a greater than 0.4% decrease in forced turnover probability.   
With respect to the relation between realized performance and forced turnovers, we find 
that, consistent with prior research, Ret_ Idiosyncratic is negatively and significantly associated 
with turnover. In terms of economic significance, a one standard deviation increase in Ret_ 
Idiosyncratic is associated with a greater than 2% increase in the probability of forced turnover 
across specifications. It is interesting to note that while Ret_ Idiosyncratic has the largest economic 
significance of any variable in the analysis, Risk_ Idiosyncratic has the second largest effect and the 
effects are of comparable magnitudes. 
For Ret_ Peer, we replicate the basic findings of Jenter and Kanaan (2008) and Kaplan and 
Minton (2006). In columns (1) and (3), Ret_ Peer is negatively and significantly associated with 
turnover, with a one standard deviation increase in Ret_ Peer associated with a greater than .94% 
decrease in the probability of forced turnover. However, in column (2), where we estimate the 
systematic component of returns relative to value-weighted market returns only, Ret_ Peer is not 
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significantly related to CEO turnover. Jenter and Kanaan (2008, tables 6 and 7) find a similar result 
and conjecture that  corporate boards take value-weighted market indexes (such as the S&P 500) 
into account when assessing the performance of their CEOs, while ignoring less directly visible 
outside influences on firm performance. While these results on Ret_ Peer represent a conundrum 
with respect to relative performance evaluation, it is beyond the scope of our paper to investigate 
this further. We refer the reader to Jenter and Kanaan (2008), who put forth a number of proposed 
explanations for these findings, although their tests do not provide convincing support for any of the 
proposed explanations for the industry effect on CEO turnover.  From this point forth, we only 
report results using industry median returns to decompose returns and return volatility into 
idiosyncratic and systematic components.  Our results with respect to risk and turnover are robust to 
all three specifications. 
We next investigate whether the results on Risk_ Idiosyncratic and Risk_ Peer documented 
in table 2 vary with two characteristics of the CEO: CEO tenure and founder status.  The length of a 
CEO’s tenure with a firm may have implications for the board’s learning process with respect to 
talent, as there is likely to be more uncertainty about the talent of newer CEOs given that the board 
has only a short time in which to assess talent. If true, this would imply that learning is relatively 
more important for younger CEOs, and consequently we would expect both Risk_ Idiosyncratic and 
Risk_ Peer to have more pronounced effects on turnover as CEO tenure gets shorter. Column (1) of 
table 3 reports the results of interacting CEO tenure with both Risk_ Idiosyncratic and Risk_ Peer. 
In table 3 we report both the Probit coefficients and the marginal effects of all variables.34  
Focusing on marginal effects, we find that the positive relation between forced turnover and Risk_ 
                                                 
34 Because of the non-linearity of the Probit function, the introduction of interaction terms makes Probit coefficients 
difficult to interpret directly. Thus, we report marginal effects, where the marginal effect of a variable is the partial 
derivative of the Probit function with respect to that variable, and the marginal effects for an interaction term is the 
cross-partial derivative with respect to the two interacted variables. These partial derivatives are evaluated at the mean 
values of all variables. To assess statistical significance, we calculate the standard errors of marginal effects using the 
delta method (see Ai and Norton, 2003 and Powers, 2004).   
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Idiosyncratic is reduced as CEO tenure increases (interaction marginal effect is negative (-.002) and 
marginally significant using a two-tailed test), while the negative relation between forced turnover 
and Risk_ Peer is also mitigated as CEO tenure increases (interaction marginal effect is positive 
(.004) and marginally significant using a two-tailed test). Of course, these results are also consistent 
with longer tenure capturing CEO entrenchment. To further assess the entrenchment story, we 
interact our risk variables with a CEO’s founder status, under the premise that firm founders are 
more likely to be entrenched than non-founders, all else equal.  However, as shown in column (2) of 
table 3, while the main effect of Founder is negative and significant (founders have a lower 
probability of being fired), the interaction of Founder with neither Risk_ Idiosyncratic nor 
Risk_Peer is significantly different from zero. 
To summarize, this section documents evidence consistent with our hypothesis that Risk_ 
Idiosyncratic is positively associated with the probability of forced turnover, while Risk_ Peer is 
negatively associated with turnover.  
4.2 Risk and CEO Turnover: Governance Metrics 
 Thus far, the analysis basically assumes that the firm is well governed, and that boards 
optimally fire CEOs when appropriate. However, the strength of a firm’s corporate governance may 
also play a role in CEO turnover decisions. While we explore CEO tenure and founder status in the 
previous section, we now extend our analysis to incorporate three aspects of a firm’s governance 
structure: the percentage of stock held by institutional investors (Institutional Own %), the 
percentage of outside directors on the board (Board Ind), and the Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) 
G-Index (typically posited to measure CEO entrenchment due to strong anti-takeover provisions). 
Table 4 includes the three governance metrics as main effects.  None of the three 
governance variables loads significantly in table 4, while our main results with respect to Risk_ 
Idiosyncratic and  Risk_Peer are robust to the inclusion of the three governance metrics. The 
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coefficient on Risk_ Idiosyncratic remains positive and significant (at the 1% level, two-tailed) 
across all specifications. The coefficient on Risk_Peer remains negative and significant when 
institutional ownership (5% level two-tailed), board independence (10% level two-tailed), and G-
index (10% level one-tailed) are included.     
We complete the analysis in this section by exploring the impact of interacting Risk_ 
Idiosyncratic and Risk_Peer with the three aspects of a firm’s governance structure.  Table 5 
documents that the only interaction term with a statistically significant marginal effect is the 
percentage of outside directors (Board Ind.) interacted with Risk_Idiosyncratic (marginal effect of 
.155, significant at the 5% level using a two-tailed test). That is, turnover becomes more sensitive to 
Risk_Idiosyncratic as the percentage of outside directors increases, consistent with outside directors 
being more reliant on the information content of realized performance to learn about CEO talent 
than are inside directors.  Although not statistically significant, the negative sign on the interaction 
of Board Ind. with Risk_Peer is also consistent with this story (outside directors are more impacted 
by noise in performance than insiders). These results complement Weisbach (1988) who documents 
that CEO turnover is more sensitive to firm performance for outsider-dominated boards than for 
insider-dominated boards. We find related results with respect to institutional ownership (Institution 
Own%).  While not statistically significant, the marginal effect of the interaction of Institution 
Own% with Risk_Idiosyncratic is positive, and its interaction with Risk_Peer is negative, again 
consistent with outsiders (in this case institutional investors) being more reliant on the information 
content of realized performance to learn about CEO talent.  We do not find any results with respect 
to the interaction of the G-Index with the two components of risk. 
Overall, tables 4 and 5 show that our fundamental result, that the probability of turnover is 
increasing in Risk_ Idiosyncratic and decreasing in Risk_Peer, is robust to the inclusion of a range 
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of CEO characteristics and firm governance characteristics. We turn next to an analysis of the 
relation being risk components and the sensitivity of turnover to performance. 
 
5. The Empirical Relation between Performance Risk and Turnover-Performance-Sensitivity 
In this section, we investigate the prediction (empirical implication 3 in section 2) that the 
sensitivity of turnover to performance is increasing in idiosyncratic risk, consistent with higher 
levels of idiosyncratic risk implying higher information content of performance with respect to 
talent, and decreasing in systematic risk, consistent with higher levels of systematic risk implying 
lower information content. The results of our analyses are documented in tables 6 and 7. 
 Table 6 presents the main results of this section. We estimate interactions between firm-
specific returns, Ret_ Idiosyncratic, and both Risk_ Idiosyncratic and Risk_Peer.  We report both 
Probit coefficients and marginal effects.  Consistent with our predictions, table 6 documents that the 
marginal effect of the interaction between Ret_ Idiosyncratic and Risk_ Idiosyncratic is negative 
and significant (marginal effect of -.038, significant at the 1% level two-tailed), and the marginal 
effect of the interaction between Ret_ Idiosyncratic and Risk_Peer is positive and significant 
(marginal effect of 0.062, significant at the 5% level two-tailed).35 This result, based on our theory 
of learning about CEO talent, stands in stark contrast to the extant executive compensation literature 
where higher performance risk generally puts downward pressure on pay-performance-sensitivity 
due to risk aversion considerations.  In fact, we find the sensitivity of turnover to performance is 
increasing in idiosyncratic risk!  
 Beyond the interaction analysis of table 6, it is also informative to consider the economic 
significance of the effects of Risk_ Idiosyncratic and Risk_Peer on the sensitivity of turnover to 
                                                 
35 Note that the marginal effect for the interaction term (Ret_Idio * Risk_Idio) has opposite sign from its coefficient 
estimate. This highlights  the potential danger when only the coefficient estimate is used to interpret the interaction term 
in Probit model (Powers, 2004).   
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performance.  Given the difficulty in assessing the economic significance of the marginal effects of 
the interaction terms in table 6, we conduct an additional partition analysis.  In table 7, panel A, we 
first rank all firms based on Risk_ Idiosyncratic and then partition the entire sample into three equal 
sub-samples. Column (1) is the low Risk_ Idiosyncratic sub-sample, Column (2) the medium Risk_ 
Idiosyncratic sub-sample, and Column (3) the high Risk_ Idiosyncratic sub-sample.  We report 
Probit coefficients and economic effects. We see that the economic effect of a one standard 
deviation increase in Ret_ Idiosyncratic changes monotonically as we move from the low Risk_ 
Idiosyncratic partition to the high Risk_ Idiosyncratic partition. Specifically, the economic effect of 
Ret_ Idiosyncratic for the low Risk_ Idiosyncratic sub-sample is -0.93%, compared to -2.53% for 
the medium Risk_ Idiosyncratic sub-sample, and -3.04 % for the high Risk_ Idiosyncratic sub-
sample. 
 In table 7, panel B, we similarly partition the sample into three equal sub-samples by 
ranking all firms based on Risk_Peer, after orthogonalizing Risk_Peer to Risk_Idiosyncratic.  We 
do this to deal with the significant correlation between Risk_Peer and Risk_Idiosyncratic (Pearson 
correlation = .5).36  We document that the economic effect of Ret_ Idiosyncratic for the low 
Risk_Peer sub-sample is -3.1% compared to only -1.9% for the high Risk_Peer sub-sample.  
 Overall, tables 6 and 7 provide evidence that the sensitivity of CEO turnover to firm-specific 
performance is increasing in Risk_ Idiosyncratic and decreasing in Risk_Peer.  These findings are 
consistent with the main argument of the paper, that the informativeness of firm-specific 
performance with respect to CEO talent is increasing in Risk_ Idiosyncratic and decreasing in 
Risk_Peer. 
  
6. Implications of CEO Turnover Decisions on CEO Compensation Contracts 
                                                 
36 Substantial correlation between Risk_Peer and Risk_Idiosyncratic is not unexpected.  For example, Fu (2009) 
documents a cross-sectional Pearson correlation between Beta and idiosyncratic volatility of .34. 
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 The model in section 2 simultaneously solves for the optimal firing rule and the optimal 
CEO compensation contract.  In this final empirical section, we study interrelations between the 
firing option and CEO compensation. First, we explore the extent to which the threat of turnover 
creates implicit incentives which reduce the explicit pay-performance-sensitivity in CEOs’ 
compensation contracts. Second, we explore how the probability of turnover impacts the future pay 
levels of CEOs who are not fired in the current period.  
6.1 Data, Measurement and Descriptive Statistics 
In building our sample for these analyses, we exclude both the first and the last year of a 
CEO’s tenure to mitigate confounding effects from one-time payments such as a first-year signing 
bonus or last-year severance pay. This implies that we only examine the compensation contracts for 
those CEOs who are retained in the year subsequent to when we estimate the probability of 
turnover. We employ ExecuComp database to obtain CEO compensation data, and use Compustat 
and CRSP for financial data. 
Recall that in our two-period model, we show that higher turnover pressure is associated 
with lower pay-performance-sensitivity (see section 2.4). This prediction is similar in spirit to the 
idea that explicit incentives from optimal compensation contracts should be weaker when implicit 
career concerns are stronger in Gibbons and Murphy (1992). We use predicted turnover probability 
to capture implicit incentives.  
To proxy for pay-performance-sensitivity (PPS), we use the dollar holding measure from 
Core and Guay (1999) and estimate the change in the dollar value of a CEO’s restricted stock grants 
and option grants in year t for 1% change in the stock price. In particular, for restricted stock grants, 
we calculate 1% of the value of the grants, and for stock option grants, we sum the option deltas 
from each option grant and multiply by 1% of the stock price. Note that, in constructing the PPS 
measure, we consider only incentives embedded in equity grants from the current year, not the 
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overall incentives implied by the CEO’s entire firm-specific equity portfolio. This approach allows 
us to measure the compensation components over which the board of directors currently has control, 
where the overall CEO equity portfolio is the result of wealth accumulation from prior periods, 
which is outside the control of board of directors’ compensation decision for the current period (see 
also Hartzell and Starks (2003) for additional discussion). We use the logarithmic transformation of 
1 + PPS (Core and Guay, 1999 and Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia, 1999 use a similar variable 
construction). 
To explore how turnover pressure affects PPS, we regress PPS (measured in year t) on the 
predicted turnover probability (measured in year t-1).  Conjecturing that the implicit incentives for 
the CEO are increasing in the predicted probability of turnover, we predict the coefficient on 
turnover probability to be negative . We include standard determinants of PPS in the regressions 
(e.g., Core and Guay, 1999 and Hartzell and Starks, 2003).  We control for firm size (logarithm of 
total assets), book-to-market ratio (BTM), Firm Age, Risk_Idiosyncratic, and Risk_Peer, all of 
which are measured in year t – 1.  We also include firm stock returns at both year t – 1 and year t 
and control for  CEO Age, CEO Tenure, and CEO Equity Holdings, which is the CEO’s equity 
ownership of the firm at year-end t – 1 (measured as the number of shares the CEO owns divided by 
total shares outstanding for the firm).  Finally, we include industry fixed effects (defined at SIC 2-
digit levels) and year dummies, and compute robust standard errors clustered at firm level. 
While our model in section 2 makes the simplifying assumption that period 2 opportunity 
utility of retained incumbents does not change with updated talent assessments (in particular that it 
is downward rigid), it is of course possible that reductions in pay are an alternative to firing the 
CEO. We explore this possibility next. In our final analysis, we investigate whether the pay-level of 
a retained CEO decreases as the probability of him being fired increases. We examine both cash 
compensation (defined as salary plus bonus) and total compensation (defined as the sum of salary, 
 30
bonus, other cash compensation, the value of stock options and restricted stock grants, long-term 
incentive plans, and all other compensation). Control variables include firm size, book-to-market 
ratio, Firm Age, Risk_Idiosyncratic, Risk_Peer, stock returns, and CEO age and tenure (Hartzell and 
Starks, 2003).  All of the firm level control variables are measured at year t – 1, except that we 
include stock returns at both year t – 1 and year t. Finally, we include industry fixed effects (defined 
at SIC 2-digit levels) and year dummies, and report robust standard errors clustered at firm level. 
Table 8 presents summary statistics used in the compensation analyses. As can be seen from 
the table, the mean (median) predicted CEO turnover probability is 4.7% (4%). The average PPS 
from CEO equity compensation is $64 thousand, and the average changes in cash and total 
compensation are $136 thousand and $292 thousand, respectively. 
6.2 Regression Results 
Table 9 displays the regression results for the relation between the CEO’s probability of 
turnover and PPS, while table 10 presents the empirical results for regressions of changes in 
compensation level on the probability of turnover. In Column (1) of table 9, we estimate the 
specification that includes control variables except Risk_Idiosyncratic, Risk_Peer, and stock returns 
at year t – 1.  The coefficient on the predicted turnover probability is negative and statistically 
significant, supporting the model prediction that turnover pressure provides implicit incentives and 
is negatively associated with pay-performance-sensitivity. We then include Risk_Idiosyncratic and 
Risk_Peer in Column (2), and additionally add stock returns at year t – 1 in Column (3).  While the 
inclusion of stock returns at year t – 1 lowers the statistical significance on the coefficient of the 
predicted turnover probability in Column (3), it remains negative and statistically significant in both 
columns. The results also suggest that PPS is significantly greater for larger (Size) and more 
established (BTM) firms. 
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Table 10 column (1) presents the specification where the dependent variable is the change in 
cash compensation, where in column (2) the dependent variable is the change in total compensation. 
While the coefficient on predicted turnover probability is not statistically significant when the 
dependent variable is the change in cash compensation, it is negative and statistically significant 
when the dependent variable is the change in total compensation. This latter result is consistent with 
Gao, Harford and Li (2008), who show that pay cuts can be a short-term substitute for dismissal. 
They find that after a pay cut, a CEO with continued poor performance is just as likely to be fired as 
a CEO with similar performance whose pay was not cut. That is, while firms do indeed at times 
keep on a poorly performing CEO at reduced pay, based on Gao, Harford and Li (2008), such 
forbearance only offers a temporary respite from termination in the face of continued poor 
performance. This implies that at some point, the firm finds it economically appropriate to fire the 
CEO rather than lower pay further (i.e., assessed talent below the cutoff).  While our modeling 
assumption of complete downward (and upward) rigidity is strong, all we really need is the 
existence of some friction in the downward adjustment of reservation utility to allow scope for 
firing. The empirical evidence is consistent with the existence of such friction. 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate the role played by performance risk in impacting a board’s 
ability to learn about a CEO’s unknown talent.  A key element in a board of director’s decision to 
retain or dismiss an incumbent CEO is the board’s assessment of the CEO’s talent. The fundamental 
insight of our paper is that the impact of performance risk on the ability of boards to learn about 
CEO talent from firm performance depends crucially on the underlying sources of the risk.  If 
volatility in performance is driven primarily by unobservable CEO talent, firm performance will be 
diagnostic about such talent.  On the other hand, if volatility in performance is driven by factors 
unrelated to CEO talent (e.g., noise, economy-wide effects, etc.), then a board’s ability to infer CEO 
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talent from performance is more limited, making it difficult to cleanly distinguish an incumbent’s 
talent level from the assessed talent of  potential  replacement CEOs.    
We conjecture that idiosyncratic volatility reflects information arrival related to the impact 
of CEO talent on aspects of performance under the CEO’s control, while systematic volatility 
captures aspects of return variability unrelated to CEO talent and beyond the CEO’s control. We 
predict that these distinct aspects of volatility will have opposite effects on CEO turnover given 
their differential implications for the process of learning about CEO talent.  We provide robust 
empirical evidence that the probability of CEO turnover is increasing in idiosyncratic, firm specific 
risk and decreasing in systematic risk, after controlling for firm performance.  
We also predict and document that turnover-performance-sensitivity increases in 
idiosyncratic risk and decreases in systematic risk, consistent with the information content of 
performance with respect to learning about CEO’s talent increasing in idiosyncratic risk and  
decreasing in systematic risk. This result stands in stark contrast to the extant executive 
compensation literature where higher performance risk from any source is generally expected to 
decrease pay-performance-sensitivity due to risk aversion considerations.  We make a fundamental 
contribution to the CEO turnover literature by focusing on the learning process of boards and 
documenting that the ability of boards to learn about CEO talent from performance depends 
crucially on the underlying sources of variability in performance. The learning perspective in our 
paper complements the executive compensation literature by shifting the focus from the impact of 
performance risk on risk premium demanded by risk-averse executives, to the role played by 
performance risk in facilitating or impeding a board’s ability to learn about CEO talent from 
realized performance.  In our turnover setting, risk impacts the learning process, and can either 
increase or decrease turnover-performance-sensitivity depending on the underlying source of the 
volatility. 
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Finally, we extend the executive compensation literature by empirically exploring 
interrelations between a board of director’s option to fire the CEO and CEO compensation.  We 
demonstrate in our model and empirically document that for retained CEOs, pay-performance-
sensitivity is decreasing in the probability of turnover, consistent with the firing option creating 
implicit incentives which reduce the need for explicit pay-performance-sensitivity in CEOs’ 
compensation contracts. We also document that for CEOs who are retained, subsequent pay levels 
are a decreasing function of the probability of turnover, consistent with Gao, Harford and Li (2008), 
who show that pay cuts can be a short-term substitute for dismissal.  
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Proof of Proposition 2 
 







































.  Taking this derivative and tedious algebra yields the condition that the 
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.  Taking this derivative and manipulating the algebra yields the 
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, expand the numerator and denominator in (A1) 
and note that the highest power of   in the numerator is 6, while in the denominator it is 12. 
 
Finally, taking the expression for K in equation (A1), it is straightforward to show that G-K>0.■ 
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Proof sketch of Proposition 3:  Period 1 Contract Given a Firing Option 
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uRHS                                                                                                                             (A4) 
RHS refers to the right-hand side of incentive comparability constraint. The last term in the incentive 
comparability constraint represents the risk premium associated with firing.37 T represents the outcome when 
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the mean-variance utility the CEO expects to receive if he is retained. Now, if we substitute the optimal 
solutions from period 2 into the above expression, we have 1uT  , which is his reservation utility.  
Taking the derivative with respect to 1e  and imposing the equilibrium condition that 1̂e = 1e , the 
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where 
                                                 
37 Since to fire or not to fire is a binary choice, it is straightforward to show that the variance equals the product of the 
































Figure 1 Time Line for the Two-Period Model 
 
 
Note: This figure demonstrates the time line for the two-period model. y1 and y2 are first and second 
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Note: Z is the Z-statistic calculated by standardizing the cutoff threshold for firing the CEO under a 
standard normal distribution. With the cutoff threshold given by *1 , expected CEO talent 







Z . The 
probability of being fired is given by )(Z , where is the cumulative distribution function for a 
standard normal and   is the standard normal density. Let 1Z  and 2Z  be the standardized cutoff 
thresholds for firm 1 and firm 2, respectively, where for example firm 2 has higher idiosyncratic 
risk than firm 1 implying 1Z  < 2Z  (see proposition 2). This figure shows that firm 2 has larger 







Analysis of Risk and CEO Turnover 
 
Table 1 Risk and CEO Turnover: Descriptive Statistics 
 
  Routine turnovers (N=1,029) Forced turnovers (N=794) Control sample (N=15,965) 
 Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev Mean Median Std Dev 
          
Ret_Idiosyncratic -0.021 -0.092 0.472 -0.135 -0.195 0.515 0.041 -0.065 0.653 
Ret_Peer 0.172 0.163 0.287 0.135 0.116 0.312 0.189 0.176 0.295 
Risk_Idiosyncratic 0.363 0.315 0.191 0.459 0.399 0.252 0.380 0.330 0.202 
Risk_Peer 0.152 0.124 0.117 0.183 0.150 0.133 0.155 0.125 0.121 
ROA 0.037 0.025 0.195 0.006 0.011 0.228 0.043 0.026 0.150 
Risk_ROA 1.546 1.268 1.267 1.878 1.784 1.220 1.522 1.292 1.220 
Size 7.581 7.483 1.681 7.303 7.104 1.866 7.369 7.184 1.764 
CEO age 61.652 63.000 7.209 53.686 54.000 6.133 54.429 55.000 7.401 
CEO tenure 12.071 9.000 8.776 7.500 6.000 5.694 8.505 6.000 7.460 
Founder 0.178 0.000 0.383 0.099 0.000 0.300 0.139 0.000 0.346 
Competition 390.930 298.000 350.049 429.411 367.000 376.257 383.377 298.000 334.662 
Firm age 27.424 24.000 20.357 22.923 17.000 18.137 24.285 21.000 18.603 
InstitutionHolding  0.592 0.606 0.200 0.581 0.600 0.216 0.587 0.602 0.202 
Board Indep% 0.631 0.667 0.175 0.651 0.667 0.170 0.643 0.667 0.179 
G-index 9.489 10.000 2.664 9.207 9.000 2.692 9.289 9.000 2.713 
 
Note: Routine turnover sample includes firm-years when a company experienced a routine turnover. Forced turnover sample includes firm-years when a company 
experienced a forced turnover. See Section 3 of the paper for detailed definition of routine turnover and forced turnover. Control sample includes all firm-years when 
there was no turnover event. ROA (return on assets) are industry median adjusted annual returns; Ret_ Idiosyncratic is calculated as the residuals from the first stage 
cross sectional regressions (annual returns) that use industry median returns to predict firm stock returns; Ret_ Peer is calculated as the predicted values from the 
first stage corss sectional regressions (annual return) that use  industry median returns to predict firm stock returns; Risk_ Idiosyncratic is calculated as the standard 
deviation of residuals from regression of daily stock returns on daily industry median returns; Risk_  peer is calculated as the standard deviation of the predicted 
values from regression of daily stock returns on daily industry median returns from year t-1; Risk_ ROA: standard deviation using 16 quarterly earnings growth rates 
after removing 2 digit SIC industry median; Size: log of assets (in millions); CEO age: age measured in years; Tenure: years being on the current CEO position; 
Founder: founder of the current company the CEO serves and defined as one if yes, zero if no; Competition: the number of potential CEO candidates measured as 
number of firms in the same 2-digit SIC code; Firm age: the age of the firm the CEO serves measured in years (using CRSP monthly return data). All the variables 
are measured at the year before the turnover event. The last 3 variables have 16,456(InstitutionHolding), 9,782 (BoardIndependence), and 13,392 (G-index) 
observations. InstitutionHolding is percentage of shares held by institutional investors in decimal; BoardIndependence is percentage of independent board members 
in decimal; G-index is Gompers-Ishii-Metrick corporate governance measure. 
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Table 2 Relation between Risk and CEO Turnover 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Peer=Industry Return  Peer =Market Return Peer=Industry + Market 
 Coefficient Economic Coefficient Economic Coefficient Economic  
       
Ret_ Idiosyncratic -0.339*** -2.065 -0.342*** -2.156 -0.337*** -2.051 
 (5.83)  (5.97)  (5.82)  
Ret_Peer -0.341*** -0.949 -0.095 -0.149 -0.336*** -0.940 
 (3.68)  (0.32)  (3.55)  
Risk_Idiosyncratic 0.744*** 1.435 0.727*** 1.427 0.760*** 1.463 
 (6.45)  (6.26)  (6.40)  
Risk_Peer -0.407** -0.464 -0.398** -0.402 -0.385** -0.433 
 (2.19)  (1.96)  (2.04)  
ROA -0.178 -0.259 -0.160 -0.233 -0.170 -0.248 
 (1.64)  (1.51)  (1.58)  
Risk_ROA 0.073*** 0.839 0.070*** 0.805 0.072*** 0.827 
 (5.12)  (4.91)  (5.04)  
Size 0.019 0.316 0.020 0.333 0.021* 0.349 
 (1.53)  (1.60)  (1.70)  
CEO age 0.001 0.069 0.001 0.069 0.001 0.069 
 (0.31)  (0.33)  (0.31)  
CEO tenure -0.003 -0.208 -0.004 -0.278 -0.003 -0.208 
 (1.15)  (1.21)  (1.15)  
Founder -0.215*** -0.695 -0.213*** -0.689 -0.215*** -0.695 
 (3.47)  (3.43)  (3.46)  
Competition 0.000* 0.000 0.000** 0.000 0.000* 0.000 
 (1.76)  (2.19)  (1.82)  
Firm age -0.001 -0.175 -0.001 -0.175 -0.001 -0.175 
 (1.00)  (1.10)  (1.00)  
       
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.053 0.054 
Observations 16,759 16,759 16,759 
N (Forced) 794 794 794 
N (Control) 15,965 15,965 15,965 
 
Note: The dependent variable is forced turnover, defined as one if there is a forced turnover, zero otherwise. All other 
variables are as defined in Table 1. Z-statistics are reported below each coefficient estimate using robust standard errors 
controlling for firm level clustering. Column (1) considers both value-weighted market and industry median returns as 
peer performance, column (2) considers only industry median return as peer performance, and column (3) considers 
only value-weighted market returns as peer performance. Year dummies are included in all specifications. Economic 
effects are calculated as the product of three terms: the coefficient estimate times mean turnover density (i.e., this 
product is the marginal effect), times the standard deviation of the variable. For Founder the economic effect is the 
product of the coefficient estimate and mean turnover density (See Greene, 1997). ***, **, * denote significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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 Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect 
     
Ret_Idiosyncratic -0.339*** -0.029*** -0.339*** -0.029*** 
 (5.84) (-6.22) (5.82) (-6.19) 
Ret_Peer -0.341*** -0.029*** -0.342*** -0.029*** 
 (3.68) (-3.76) (3.69) (-3.77) 
Risk_Idiosyncratic 0.898*** 0.061*** 0.734*** 0.063*** 
 (5.91) (5.97) (5.98) (6.38) 
Risk_Peer -0.719*** -0.033*** -0.392* -0.035** 
 (2.74) (-2.11) (1.95) (-2.17) 
CEO tenure -0.001 -0.000   
 (0.23) (-1.22)   
CEO tenure * Risk_Idio -0.022 -0.002*   
 (1.48) (-1.75)   
CEO tenure * Risk_Peer 0.039* 0.004*   
 (1.74) (1.85)   
Founder   -0.233* -0.016*** 
   (1.70) (-3.59) 
Founder * Risk_Idio   0.066 -0.018 
   (0.27) (-1.23) 
Founder * Risk_Peer   -0.090 0.006 
   (0.24) (0.25) 
ROA -0.176 -0.015 -0.178 -0.015 
 (1.61) (-1.61) (1.63) (-1.63) 
Risk_ROA 0.072*** 0.006*** 0.073*** 0.006*** 
 (5.08) (5.05) (5.13) (5.11) 
Size 0.019 0.002 0.019 0.002 
 (1.52) (1.52) (1.52) (1.52) 
CEO age 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.23) (0.23) (0.32) (0.32) 
Competition 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 0.000* 
 (1.76) (1.76) (1.75) (1.75) 
Firm age -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.97) (-0.97) (1.01) (-1.01) 
     
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.054 
Observations 16,759 16,759 
N (Forced) 794 794 
N (Control) 15,965 15,965 
   
Note: The dependent variable is forced turnover which is defined as one if there is a forced turnover, zero otherwise. 
All other variables are as defined in Table 1. Z-statistics are reported below each coefficient estimate and they are 
based on robust standard errors controlling for firm level clustering. Year dummies are included in all specifications. 
Column (1) is when the interactions between tenure and risk are considered, and column (2) is when the interactions 
between founder and risk are considered. Year dummies are included in all specifications. Marginal effects are 
calculated as the change in the probability of a forced turnover for a one unit change in the explanatory variable, 
holding all other variables at the mean values. Z-statistics are calculated using the delta method (Ai and Norton, 
2003) ).  ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 4 Risk and CEO Turnover: Controlling for Corporate Governance Measures 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal 
       
Ret_Idiosyncratic -0.333*** -0.029*** -0.417*** -0.041*** -0.355*** -0.031*** 
 (5.72) (-6.09) (5.70) (-6.05) (4.66) (-4.90) 
Ret_Peer -0.335*** -0.029*** -0.283*** -0.028*** -0.338*** -0.030*** 
 (3.62) (-3.70) (2.69) (-2.73) (3.14) (-3.20) 
Risk_Idiosyncratic 0.761*** 0.065*** 0.873*** 0.085*** 0.870*** 0.076*** 
 (6.55) (6.52) (5.66) (5.60) (6.65) (6.65) 
Risk_Peer -0.400** -0.034** -0.401* -0.039* -0.326 -0.029 
 (2.14) (-2.15) (1.83) (-1.84) (1.53) (-1.54) 
ROA -0.181 -0.016 -0.061 -0.006 -0.071 -0.006 
 (1.63) (-1.63) (0.56) (-0.56) (0.44) (-0.43) 
Risk_ROA 0.072*** 0.006*** 0.064*** 0.006*** 0.070*** 0.006*** 
 (5.04) (5.02) (3.80) (3.81) (4.62) (4.61) 
Size 0.021* 0.002* 0.023 0.002 0.015 0.001 
 (1.71) (1.71) (1.58) (1.58) (1.14) (1.14) 
CEO age 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (0.32) (0.32) (0.00) (0.00) (0.25) (0.25) 
CEO tenure -0.003 -0.000 -0.004 -0.000 -0.003 -0.000 
 (1.14) (-1.14) (1.10) (-1.10) (0.93) (-0.93) 
Founder -0.215*** -0.016*** -0.181** -0.016** -0.218*** -0.016*** 
 (3.42) (-3.96) (2.15) (-2.44) (2.76) (-3.24) 
Competition 0.000* 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.79) (1.78) (1.61) (1.61) (1.29) (1.29) 
Firm age -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.98) (-0.98) (1.13) (-1.13) (0.66) (-0.66) 
Institution Own% -0.003 -0.000     
 (0.03) (-0.03)     
Board Ind.   0.108 0.011   
   (0.86) (0.86)   
G-index     -0.000 -0.000 
     (0.05) (-0.05) 
Constant -2.694***  -2.112***  -2.626***  
 (12.86)  (8.69)  (11.17)  
    
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.050 0.054 
Observations 16,456 9,782 13,392 
N (Forced) 786 528 648 
N (Control) 15,670 9,254 12,744 
 
Note: The dependent variable is forced turnover which is defined as one if there is a forced turnover, zero otherwise. 
All other variables are as defined in Table 1. Z-statistics are reported below each coefficient estimate and they are based 
on robust standard errors controlling for firm level clustering. Year dummies are included in all specifications. Column 
(1) is when the institution ownership is added. Column (2) is when the board independence is added and column (3) is 
when G-index is added. Year dummies are included in all specifications. Marginal effects are calculated as the change 
in the probability of a forced turnover for a one unit change in the explanatory variable, holding all other variables at the 
mean values. ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively.
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 Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal Coefficient Marginal 
       
Ret_Idiosyncratic -0.331*** -0.028*** -0.417*** -0.041*** -0.353*** -0.031*** 
 (5.71) (-6.06) (5.70) (-6.06) (4.64) (-4.87) 
Ret_Peer -0.329*** -0.028*** -0.283*** -0.028*** -0.334*** -0.029*** 
 (3.55) (-3.62) (2.68) (-2.73) (3.10) (-3.16) 
Risk_Idiosyncratic 0.451** 0.076*** -0.056 0.092*** 0.463 0.079*** 
 (2.08) (6.85) (0.13) (5.99) (1.31) (6.82) 
Risk_Peer 0.115 -0.042** 0.447 -0.044** -0.186 -0.029 
 (0.24) (-2.58) (0.66) (-2.06) (0.29) (-1.52) 
Institution Own% -0.153 -0.003     
 (0.89) (-0.38)     
Institution Own%*Risk_Idio 0.715* 0.057     
 (1.85) (1.64)     
Institution Own%*Risk_Peer -1.019 -0.086     
 (1.34) (-1.27)     
Board Ind.   -0.291 0.003   
   (1.01) (0.22)   
Board Ind.*Risk_Idio   1.522** 0.155**   
   (2.35) (2.47)   
Board Ind.*Risk_Peer   -1.394 -0.140   
   (1.35) (-1.38)   
G-Index     -0.016 -0.000 
     (1.04) (-0.20) 
G-Index*Risk_Idio     0.047 0.004 
     (1.23) (1.17) 
G-Index*Risk_Peer     -0.015 -0.001 
     (0.22) (-0.21) 
ROA -0.193* -0.017* -0.066 -0.006 -0.075 -0.007 
 (1.65) (-1.65) (0.61) (-0.60) (0.46) (-0.46) 
Risk_ROA 0.072*** 0.006*** 0.064*** 0.006*** 0.069*** 0.006*** 
 (5.01) (4.99) (3.78) (3.79) (4.57) (4.56) 
 
 
Control Variables Included  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
       
       
Pseudo R2 0.054 0.051 0.055 
Observations 16,456 9,782 13,392 
N (Forced) 786 528 648 
N (Control) 15,670 9,254 12,744 
    
Note: The dependent variable is forced turnover which is defined as one if there is a forced turnover, zero otherwise. All 
other variables are as defined in Table 1. Z-statistics, reported below each coefficient estimate, are based on robust 
standard errors controlling for firm level clustering. Control variables included, but not reported are Size, CEO Age, CEO 
Tenure, Founder, Competition and Firm Age. Year dummies are included in all specifications. Column (1) reports 
interactions between institutional holding (Institution Own%) and risk, column (2) reports interactions between the 
proportion of outside directors (Board Ind.) and risk, and column (3) reports interactions between G-index and risk. 
Marginal effects are calculated as the change in the probability of a forced turnover for a one unit change in the 
explanatory variable, holding all other variables at the mean values. Z-statistics are calculated using the delta method (Ai 
and Norton, 2003).  ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Ret_Idiosyncratic -0.489*** -0.033*** 
 (5.75) (-6.86) 
Ret_Peer -0.363*** -0.031*** 
 (3.96) (-4.04) 
Risk_Idiosyncratic 0.738*** 0.062*** 
 (6.33) (6.31) 
Risk_Peer -0.378** -0.031** 
 (2.06) (-1.98) 
Ret_Idio * Risk_Idio 0.058 -0.038*** 
 (0.65) (-3.93) 
Ret_Idio * Risk_Peer 0.489* 0.062** 
 (1.82) (2.53) 
ROA -0.185* -0.016* 
 (1.78) (-1.78) 
Risk_ROA 0.073*** 0.006*** 
 (5.15) (5.13) 
Size 0.019 0.002 
 (1.51) (1.51) 
CEO age 0.001 0.000 
 (0.28) (0.28) 
CEO tenure -0.003 -0.000 
 (1.13) (-1.13) 
Founder -0.214*** -0.016*** 
 (3.44) (-3.97) 
Competition 0.000* 0.000* 
 (1.67) (1.66) 
Firm age -0.001 -0.000 
 (1.01) (-1.01) 
   
Pseudo R2 0.054 
Observations 16,759 
N (Forced) 794 
N (Control) 15,965 
  
Note: The dependent variable is forced turnover which is defined as one if there is a forced turnover, zero 
otherwise. All other variables are as defined in Table 1. Z-statistics, reported below each coefficient estimate, are 
based on robust standard errors controlling for firm level clustering. Year dummies are included in all 
specifications. Marginal effects are calculated as the change in the probability of a forced turnover for a one unit 
change in the explanatory variable, holding all other variables at the mean values. Z-statistics are calculated 
using the delta method (Ai and Norton, 2003).  ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
(two-tailed) respectively. 
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Table 7 Turnover-Performance-Sensitivity and Risk: Analysis of Economic Significance 
 
Panel A: Partitioned by Risk_Idiosyncratic 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Low Risk_Idiosyncratic Med Risk_Idiosyncratic High Risk_Idiosyncratic 
 Coefficient Economic Coefficient Economic Coefficient Economic 
       
Ret_Idiosyncratic -0.472*** -0.931 -0.681*** -2.525 -0.263*** -3.040 
 (2.87)  (5.84)  (4.52)  
Ret_Peer -0.778*** -1.424 -0.511*** -1.346 -0.197 -0.753 
 (3.60)  (3.36)  (1.53)  
Risk_Idiosyncratic 1.670** 0.790 0.394 0.299 0.559*** 1.361 
 (2.05)  (0.50)  (3.52)  
Risk_Peer 0.877 0.477 -0.437 -0.368 -0.538** -0.976 
 (1.30)  (1.04)  (2.28)  
       
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Pseudo R2 0.042 0.054 0.072 
Observations 5,582 5,591 5,586 
N (Forced) 189 250 355 
N (Control) 5,393 5,341 5,231 
 
Panel B: Partitioned by Residual Risk_Peer 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Low Residual Risk_Peer Med Residual Risk_Peer High Residual Risk_Peer 
 Coefficient Economic Coefficient Economic Coefficient Economic 
       
Ret_Idiosyncratic -0.446*** -3.138 -0.305** -1.347 -0.301*** -1.939 
 (6.40)  (2.47)  (3.21)  
Ret_Peer -0.505*** -1.421 -0.517*** -1.270 -0.130 -0.379 
 (3.41)  (3.21)  (0.95)  
Risk_Idiosyncratic 0.408* 0.927 0.840 1.244 0.905*** 1.649 
 (1.83)  (1.43)  (3.04)  
Risk_Peer 1.556* 1.023 -0.531 -0.370 -0.846* -1.137 
 (1.95)  (0.30)  (1.76)  
       
Controls Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Ye 
    
Pseudo R2 0.077 0.053 0.058 
Observations 5,582 5,591 5,586 
N (Forced) 302 248 244 
N (Control) 5,280 5,343 5,342 
 
Note: Panel A is partitioned on idiosyncratic risk and panel B is partitioned on residual peer risk (residual from 
regression of Risk_Peer on Risk_Idiosyncratic). The dependent variable is forced turnover which is defined as one if 
there is a forced turnover, zero otherwise. All other variables are as defined in Table 1. Z-statistics are reported below 
each coefficient estimate using robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. Column (1) is the low risk group, 
column (2) is the medium risk group and column (3) is the high risk group. Control variables included, but not reported 
are ROA, Risk_ROA, Size, CEO Age, CEO Tenure, Founder, Competition and Firm Age. Year dummies are included in 
all specifications. Economic effects (Economic) are calculated as the product of three terms: the coefficient estimate 
times mean turnover density (i.e., this product is the marginal effect), times the standard deviation of the variable. ***, 
**, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively.                                              
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Relation between Turnover Probability and Compensation 
 
Table 8 CEO Turnover and Compensation: Summary statistics  
 
PPS sample     
     
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev 
     
PPS 10,917 63.544 23.002 219.412 
Predicted TO Probability  10,917 4.675 4.036 3.145 
Sizet-1 7991 7.628 7.465 1.789 
BTM t-1 7991 0.481 0.417 0.382 
CEO Age 7991 55.242 56 6.817 
CEO Tenure 7991 8.985 7 6.317 
Firm Age 7991 26.861 23 19.568 
Risk_Idio t-1 7991 0.369 0.317 0.197 
Risk_Peer t-1 7991 0.167 0.137 0.125 
Ret t 7991 0.185 0.113 0.564 
Ret t-1 7991 0.224 0.136 0.632 
CEO Equity Holding t-1 7991 0.017 0.003 0.044 
     
Compensation sample     
     
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev 
     
Change in Cash Comp 13,346 136.018 69.715 1,350.75 
Change in Total Comp 13,196 292.058 124.702 10,992.81 
Predicted TO Probability  13,346 4.750 4.093 3.036 
Size t-1 13,346 7.446 7.262 1.749 
BTM t-1 13,346 0.515 0.440 0.409 
CEO Age 13,346 55.570 56 7.346 
CEO Tenure 13,346 9.633 7 7.460 
Firm Age 13,346 25.744 22 18.729 
Risk_Idio t-1 13,346 0.374 0.324 0.199 
Risk_Peer t-1 13,346 0.160 0.130 0.122 
Ret t 13,346 0.182 0.111 0.554 
Ret t-1 13,346 0.219 0.129 0.669 
 
Notes: PPS: the change in the dollar value of the CEO’s restricted stock grants and option grants for a 1% change in 
stock price in year t; Change in Cash Comp: the change in cash compensation, and measured as cash compensation in 
year t minus cash compensation in year t-1 ; Change in Total Comp: the change in total compensation, and measured as 
total compensation in year t minus total compensation in year t-1; Predicted TO Probability: the predicted value from 
the model in Column (1) of Table 2 times 100;  Size: the logarithm of total assets (compustat data6, in millions) 
measured at year t-1; BTM: the book to market ratio, and measured as book value over market value of equity at year t-
1; CEO age: age measured in years; Tenure: years being on the current CEO position; Firm age: the age of the firm the 
CEO serves measured in years (using CRSP monthly return data); Risk_ Idio: the standard deviation of residuals from 
regression of daily stock returns on daily industry median returns at year t-1; Risk_  peer: the standard deviation of the 
predicted values from regression of daily stock returns on daily industry median returns at year t-1; Ret t: stock returns 




Table 9 Relation between Turnover Probability and Pay-Performance-Sensitivity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Predicted TO Probability -0.018*** -0.039*** -0.015* 
 (-3.09) (-6.07) (-1.81) 
Size t-1 0.491*** 0.512*** 0.502*** 
 (34.01) (33.57) (32.30) 
BTM t-1 -0.885*** -0.852*** -0.838*** 
 (-8.71) (-8.60) (-8.60) 
CEO age -0.009*** -0.006** -0.007** 
 (-2.91) (-2.11) (-2.20) 
CEO tenure 0.007** 0.005 0.007** 
 (2.37) (1.62) (2.16) 
Firm Age -0.004*** -0.002** -0.002** 
 (-3.30) (-2.32) (-2.25) 
Ret t 0.658*** 0.658*** 0.657*** 
 (21.39) (21.42) (21.47) 
CEO Equity Holding t-1 -0.738 -0.828 -0.761 
 (-1.27) (-1.44) (-1.34) 
Risk_Idio  0.571*** 0.254 
  (4.24) (1.63) 
Risk_Peer  0.658*** 0.756*** 
  (3.62) (3.99) 
Ret t-1   0.130*** 
   (4.56) 
Constant -0.521*** -1.050*** -0.956*** 
 (-2.70) (-4.75) (-4.36) 
    
Observations 7991 7991 7991 
Adj. R2 0.56 0.56 0.56 
    
Note: The dependent variable is the logarithm of (1+PPS), with PPS (pay performance sensitivity) is the change in the 
dollar value of the CEO’s restricted stock grants and option grants for a 1% change in stock price in year t defined in 
table 8. Predicted turnover probability is estimated using the specification in table 2, column 1. All the other variables 
are as defined in table 8. Industry (defined at 2-digit SIC levels) fixed effects and year dummies are included. t statistics  
is below each coefficient and estimated using robust standard error clustered at firm level. ***, **, * denote significance 




Table 10 Relation between Turnover Probability and Changes in Compensation Levels 
 
 
 (1) (2) 
 Change in Cash Comp. Change in Total Comp. 
   
Predicted TO Probability 4.811 -288.905*** 
 (0.84) (-3.10) 
Size t-1 48.184*** 149.512 
 (5.56) (1.49) 
BTM t-1 -26.789 67.871 
 (-0.88) (0.29) 
CEO age 0.757 2.460 
 (0.82) (0.26) 
CEO tenure -1.792 -4.967 
 (-1.40) (-0.64) 
Firm Age 0.489 0.654 
 (1.17) (0.21) 
Risk_Idio 58.917 1,900.173 
 (0.67) (1.28) 
Risk_Peer -135.154 -2,271.832* 
 (-1.19) (-1.73) 
ret t 239.509*** 1,560.775*** 
 (7.95) (4.39) 
ret t-1 33.976** -75.561 
 (2.05) (-0.16) 
Constant -316.683*** -1,466.910* 
 (-3.96) (-1.71) 
   
Observations 13346 13196 
Adj. R2 0.02 0.01 
   
Note: Change in Cash Comp is the change in cash compensation, measured as cash compensation in 
year t minus cash compensation in year t-1 ; Change in Total Comp is the change in total 
compensation, measured as total compensation in year t minus total compensation in year t-1; 
Predicted turnover probability is estimated using the specification in table 2, column 1. Industry 
(defined at 2-digit SIC levels) fixed effects and year dummies are included. t statistics  are in 
parentheses below each coefficient and are estimated using robust standard error clustered at firm level. 
All other variables are as defined Table 8.  ***, **, * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 
 
 
